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Home | People | Ines Lindner

Ines Lindner

Research Fellow

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Research field
Complex-systems, Mathematical Methods, Networks


Two recent publications: 

I. Lindner and H. Strulik, Innovation and Inequality in a Small World, 2019, Forthcoming in International Economic Review
B. Heidergott and J.P. Huang and I. Lindner, 2019, Naïve learning in social networks with random communication. Social Networks, 58, 1-11

List of publications

Lindner, I. (2020). Innovation and Inequality in a Small World International Economic Review, :.

Koster, M., Kurz, S., Lindner, I. and Napel, S. (2017). The prediction value Social Choice and Welfare, 48(2):433--460.

Huang, J., Koster, M. and Lindner, I. (2016). Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics Mathematical Social Sciences, 84(November):109--118.

Lindner, I. and Strulik, H. (2014). From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World Journal of Development Economics, 109(July):17--29.

Lindner, I. (2012). [Review of] Annick Laruelle and Federico Valencio: Voting and collective decision-making (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) Social Choice and Welfare, 38(1):161--179.

Lindner, I., Koster, M., Lindelauf, R. and Owen, G. (2008). Mass-Mobilization with Noisy Conditional Beliefs Mathematical Social Sciences, 55(1):55--77.

Lindner, I. (2008). A Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed Theory and Decision, 64(4):495--518.

Lindner, I. and Strulik, H. (2008). Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms end Economic Development Economica, 75:244--258.

Lindner, I. (2008). The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters Social Choice and Welfare, 30(4):581--601.

Lindner, I. (2008). A Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters Economic Theory, 35(3):607--611.

Lindner, I. and Owen, G. (2007). Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold Mathematical Social Sciences, 53(3):232--238.

Owen, G., Lindner, I., Feld, S., Grofman, B. and Ray, L. (2006). A Simple 'Market Value' Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems International Journal of Game Theory, 35(1):111--128.

Lindner, I. and Strulik, H. (2004). Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution Economic Theory, 23(2):439--444.

Lindner, I. and Machover, M. (2004). L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases Mathematical Social Sciences, 47(1):37--49.

Lindner, I. and Strulik, H. (2004). Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights Public Choice, 120:143--167.